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Recruiting Dark Personalities for Earnings Management
Abstract
Prior research indicates that managers’ dark personality traits increase their tendency to
engage in disruptive and unethical organizational behaviors including accounting earnings
management. Other research suggests that the prevalence of dark personalities in management
may represent an accidental byproduct of selecting managers with accompanying desirable
attributes that fit the stereotype of a “strong leader.” Our paper posits that organizations may hire
some managers who have dark personality traits because their willingness to push ethical
boundaries aligns with organizational objectives, particularly in the accounting context where
ethical considerations are especially important. Using several validation studies and experiments,
we find that experienced executives and recruiting professionals favor hiring a candidate with
dark personality traits into an accounting management position over an otherwise better-qualified
candidate when the hiring organization faces pressure to manage earnings. Our results help to
illuminate why individuals with dark personality traits may effectively compete for high-level
accounting positions.
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Recruiting Dark Personalities for Earnings Management
1. Introduction
Prior research indicates that managers’ dark personality traits increase their tendency to
engage in earnings management, fraud, and a variety of other unethical or negative workplace
behaviors (Duchon and Drake 2009, Amernic and Craig 2010, Boddy 2011, Kalshoven et al.
2011, Den Zona et al. 2013, Rijsenbilt and Commandeur 2013, Olsen et al. 2014, Majors 2016,
Ham et al. 2017, Buchholz et al. 2019, Van Scotter and Roglio 2020). Yet, a number of other
studies suggest that individuals with dark personalities may possess accompanying attributes
considered desirable in a business context, such as confidence, perceived creativity, ability to
manage impressions, and aggressive pursuit of business opportunities (Caldwell and O’Reilly
1982, Raskin et al. 1991, Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, Brunell et al. 2008, Babiak et al. 2010,
Goncalo et al. 2010, Nevicka et al. 2011, Zettler and Solga 2013, Ong et al. 2016). Thus, the
extant literature largely frames the prevalence of dark personalities in management as an
accidental byproduct of selecting managers who fit the stereotype of a “strong leader.” In
contrast, our paper posits that organizations may hire some managers with dark personalities
because their willingness to push ethical boundaries aligns with organizational objectives.
Accounting represents a functional area within organizations where ethical considerations
are particularly critical, and where managers regularly face pressure to manage earnings to meet
organizational objectives (Brown and Caylor 2005, Gowthorpe and Omat 2005, Graham et al.
2005, Cohen et al. 2010, Dichev et al. 2013, Kelly and Murphy 2019, Brazel et al. 2020, Suh et
al. 2020). Because research shows that individuals with dark personalities are more likely to push
ethical boundaries, we examine whether job candidates possessing these traits are more likely to
be hired into accounting management positions when engaging in earnings management aligns
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with organizational objectives. Using several instrument validation studies and experiments, we
demonstrate that experienced financial executives (corporate recruiters) are more likely to hire
(recommend hiring) a senior accounting manager with dark personality traits when the
organization faces earnings management pressure, despite this candidate being judged as a
relatively poor job candidate along multiple other management and interpersonal dimensions.
Our results also suggest that the proliferation of managers with dark personalities may be due to
their perceived superior fit with organizations in which organizational financial objectives
sometimes conflict with ethical obligations. The results reveal how the recruiting process may
reinforce and exacerbate the ongoing economic, social, and political costs of earnings
management.
To our knowledge, no prior study has examined the link between earnings management
pressure and the hiring process in organizations. One possible reason for the absence of
empirical evidence is that the necessary employment files are either confidential or completely
unavailable. We circumvent this data availability problem by conducting experiments in which
two hypothetical job candidates compete for a high-level accounting position. By design, there
are no substantive differences between the candidates in terms of education, experience, or
technical qualifications. However, the candidates differ in terms of their personality traits. The
personality profile of one job candidate (referred to as “Candidate A”) indicates many dark
personality traits, including high narcissism, low idealism, high moral disengagement, high
Machiavellianism, and high self-monitoring. Prior research indicates that these dark personality
traits are associated with a predisposition to manage earnings (e.g., Murphy 2012, Ham et al.
2017). The personality profile of the other candidate (referred to as “Candidate B”) indicates

3
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fewer dark personality traits.1 Appendix A shows the personality profiles of the job candidates,
and Appendix B provides a summary of their development. In our experiments, we do not
overtly state that either candidate does or does not manage earnings. Instead, participants must
infer any such predisposition from the personality profiles.
In order to draw valid inferences from our experiments (i.e., that accounting managers
with dark personalities may be favored for selection because their willingness to push ethical
boundaries aligns with organizational objectives, even when those managers possess fewer
desirable managerial attributes), it is necessary that the job candidate personality profiles convey
two messages simultaneously – (1) Candidate A has dark personality traits associated with a
predisposition to manage earnings while Candidate B does not and (2) Candidate B, relative to
Candidate A, is considered to be an equally (or more) capable manager overall. Our instrument
validation studies reveal that the personality profiles not only convey the above messages, but
they demonstrate that Candidate B is viewed as a significantly better manager overall. Further,
the instrument validation studies reveal that Candidate A, relative to Candidate B, is perceived to
be more likely to engage in fraud (and other disreputable acts), and perceived to be less likely to
maintain high ethical standards in the face of adversity. Our experiments also provide evidence
that Candidate A is judged to be less likeable than Candidate B. All else being equal, these
differences should forcefully push participants towards hiring Candidate B and away from hiring
Candidate A. However, if participants place a sufficiently high value on one particular
managerial attribute – the ability and willingness to manage earnings – Candidate A will be

1

Our research instruments vary whether the job candidates are referred to as Candidate A or Candidate B (see
Section 3). For expositional simplicity, we refer to the job candidate who has more dark personality traits as
Candidate A and the job candidate who has fewer dark personality traits as Candidate B.
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selected over Candidate B despite the fact that Candidate A possesses a constellation of generally
negative personality traits and predispositions.
We conduct three separate experiments to test our research hypothesis from different
angles. While each of our experiments carries the same weight in hypothesis testing, each
contains design features that help us to (1) capture the richness of the environment in which
important hiring decisions are made in practice and (2) rule out potential alternative explanations
for our results. We use different sets of participants (financial executives, individuals with prior
finance/accounting coursework and work experience, and professional recruiters), different
operationalizations of earnings management pressure (public company facing capital market
pressure versus non-profit foundation, and private company facing IPO versus not), and multiple
measures of candidate preference (hiring decisions, referral decisions, and person-organization
fit assessments). Our sequence of experiments therefore capitalizes on the strengths of a multiple
experiment approach as described by Asay et al. (2019).
In each experiment, participants learn that an organization is seeking to fill a high-level
accounting management position. The job candidate who is hired to fill the position will oversee
accounting operations and make judgments and decisions related to financial reporting.2 In
Experiment 1, we manipulate the type of hiring organization, and financial executive participants
assume the role of an executive at either a for-profit public company or a non-profit foundation.
They evaluate the organizational fit and likelihood of hiring Candidate A as significantly higher
at the for-profit public company, suggesting that the perceived fit between dark personality traits
and earnings management pressure significantly impacts hiring decisions. In Experiment 2, we

2

As we discuss later, the role of the chosen candidate in the organization does not extend beyond the accounting
function. As a result, the perceived capability of a job candidate to engage in business activities that create firm
value are only relevant insofar as those capabilities translate into managing the accounting function.
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hold the hiring organization constant (a for-profit private company) with financial statement
purpose manipulated between participants, and participants assume the role of the company
owner. When financial statements are used for valuation as opposed to owner monitoring,
participants rate Candidate A as significantly more likely to be hired. In Experiment 3, we hold
the hiring organization constant (a for-profit public company that faces earnings management
pressure) with candidate personality profile manipulated between participants, and professional
recruiting participants make a referral decision for this company. They indicate a higher
likelihood of referring Candidate A for the position, suggesting that candidates with dark
personalities may already be preselected early in the hiring process. Taken together, our results
suggest that in two different company contexts and across three different groups of participants,
senior accounting managers with dark personalities are more likely to be matched to positions
that require pushing ethical boundaries.
Our research makes three interrelated contributions to the accounting and business ethics
literatures. First, we provide evidence relevant to answering a provocative question – are
individuals who are most likely to engage in earnings management also the individuals who are
most likely to ascend to positions of power and authority in the accounting function of
organizations? This question has been asked for decades, but not investigated. For example,
Rosenzweig and Fischer (1994, p. 33) speculate that accountants “who have loose standards
regarding earnings management may be more likely to be promoted” and that lower-level
employees “will learn quickly that the route to success in the organization is not facilitated by
truthful reporting.” Related to this claim, Parfet (2000, p. 485-486) contends that earnings
management “is expected and demanded, both inside and outside of business, by all stakeholders
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in the capital market.” We provide the first evidence relevant to addressing the descriptive
validity of these claims.
Second, our results add to research on the relation between dark personalities and
managerial success. Some researchers suggest that individuals who have dark personality traits
may ascend to positions of power and authority in organizations because they are, perhaps
incorrectly, viewed as superior leaders (Rosenthal and Pittinsky 2006, Brunell et al. 2008,
Schnure 2010) or because, through self-promotion and impression management, they may
convince evaluators that their job performance is better than it really is (Caldwell and O’Reilly
1982, Judge et al. 2006, Zettler and Solga 2013). Our results suggest that evaluators may have
entirely correct beliefs about an individual’s capabilities/skills/predispositions, and that the
propensity for dark personalities to push ethical boundaries in and of itself increases fit with
certain organizations.
Third, we provide evidence relevant to assessing the efficacy of regulators’ current
approach to curtailing earnings management (i.e., increased amounts of regulation). Our results
suggest that regulatory efforts to curtail earnings management may achieve greater success if
those efforts simultaneously target the cultural dimension of earnings management that is played
out through the employee selection process. Indeed, the former chairman of the SEC, Arthur
Levitt, hinted at doing more than enacting additional regulations when he called for “nothing less
than a fundamental cultural change on the part of corporate management as well as the whole
financial community” to eliminate earnings management (Levitt 1998, p. 18). However, it is hard
to solve a problem when a major underlying cause is not well illuminated. Our research helps to
illuminate why earnings management stubbornly persists despite regulatory efforts to curtail that
behavior.

7
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops our main research
hypothesis. Section 3 presents two instrument validation studies that help to validate certain
features of the personality profiles used in our three experiments. Sections 4, 5, and 6 discuss
Experiments 1, 2, and 3, respectively, which contain the main empirical tests of our research
hypothesis. Section 7 provides a conclusion and suggestions for future research in this area.
2. Theory and Hypothesis
2.1 Earnings Management Incentives and Trends
Competition is a powerful force—it favors organizations that use efficient operating
procedures and contracting techniques and weeds out organizations that do not (Alchian 1950,
Zimmerman 2003, Brickley et al. 2009). In competitive economic systems, business practices
that survive over time tend to yield benefits in excess of their costs or those practices would
eventually cease (Alchian 1950, Watts and Zimmerman 1986, Zimmerman 2003, Brickley et al.
2009). Many organizations face considerable pressure to achieve various earnings-related
objectives, and some professionals may engage in earnings management to achieve those
objectives (Graham et al. 2005, Dichev et al. 2013).3 The practice of earnings management has
survived for many decades (Healy and Wahlen 1999, Dechow and Skinner 2000, Cohen et al.
2008) and continues to occur to this date (Dichev et al. 2013), indicating that the benefits of
earnings management exceed the associated costs, on average. There is also indirect evidence
that the market rewards (or fails to penalize) earnings management. Bartov et al. (2002) find that
the market reward for meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts is only marginally affected
by whether organizations manage earnings to meet those forecasts. Similarly, Das et al. (2011)

3

Examples of earnings-related objectives include, but are not limited to, avoiding negative earnings surprises
(Brown and Caylor 2005), avoiding losses and earnings decreases (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997), and reporting
smooth earnings (Graham et al. 2005).
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find that, while there is a market penalty for managing earnings to meet an earnings threshold,
the market reward exceeds the market penalty.
Despite potential benefits of managing earnings, there are potential drawbacks. Earnings
management creates a permissive ethical climate (Merchant and Rockness 1994, Jensen 2001,
Albrecht, et al. 2012), and seemingly innocuous forms of earnings management may precipitate
more extreme forms of earnings management, including outright fraud (Schrand and Zechman
2012). In addition, regulators and practitioners have adopted the view that earnings management
is pervasive and problematic. Levitt (1998) frames earnings management as one of the most
fundamental threats to efficient and liquid markets, highlights the loss of unbiased information
and communication with shareholders, and discusses how numerous regulators attempt to work
together to strengthen auditing and financial reporting oversight to prevent earnings
management. Dechow and Skinner (2000) indicate that accounting researchers appear to have
more permissive views of earnings management than regulators and practitioners, who perceive
earnings management as particularly damaging to investors. Consistent with this view, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) requires company executives to certify that the financial
statements are complete and accurate, and it also requires public companies to adopt a code of
ethics (or explain why a code has not been adopted). Many of the expected benefits of SOX have
been realized. For example, SOX has improved (1) governance (Linck et al. 2009, Cohen et al.
2010, Carcello et al 2011), (2) the ethical climate (Wagner and Dittmar 2006, Albrecht et al.
2012), (3) audit committee efficacy (DeZoort et al. 2008), and (4) earnings quality (AshbaughSkaife et al. 2008). SOX has also resulted in more conservative earnings (Lobo and Zhou 2006,
Iliev 2010) and improved market liquidity (Jain et al. 2008). Further, there are potentially large
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wealth-related consequences for executives when accounting-related improprieties are uncovered
(Dechow et al. 1996, Desai 2006, Feng et al. 2011).
Although some forces may discourage earnings management, there are labor market
forces that may promote it. Individuals in the accounting labor market who are able and willing
to manage earnings compete against other members of the labor market who may be unable or
unwilling to manage earnings. Individuals who possess the abilities demanded by prospective
employers are likely to successfully compete for higher-level positions, while individuals who
lack those abilities are likely to languish in lower-level positions. The survey results of Graham
et al. (2005) suggest that failure to meet an earnings target is viewed by the labor market as a
managerial failure, and repeatedly missing an earnings target inhibits a manager’s labor market
mobility. Professionals seem to understand the importance that investors and others ascribe to
earnings, and evidence indicates that managers sometimes find it necessary to manage earnings
(Graham et al. 2005, Dichev et al. 2013).
Scholars have speculated that incentives present in many organizations may result in a
striking outcome – individuals who are most likely to manage earnings are also the ones who are
most likely to ascend to positions of power and authority in the accounting function (Bruns and
Merchant 1990, Merchant and Rockness 1994, Rosenzweig and Fischer 1994, Fuller and Jensen
2002). This speculation is broadly compatible with a rational labor market matching process
whereby certain types of people are attracted to, recruited and selected by, and continue
employment in certain types of organizations (Schneider 1987). The management literature
indicates that it is desirable for organizations to hire individuals who fit the work environment
(Edwards 2008), which helps organizations maintain a workforce that is committed to achieving
key objectives (Kristof 1996). As such, when making important hiring decisions, organizations

10
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first identify what the position requires in terms of employee knowledge, skills, abilities, and
other attributes (e.g., personality traits) and then hire an individual who possesses those desired
attributes (Schneider 2001).
2.2 Dark Personalities and Leader Behavior
Prior research indicates that individuals with dark personality traits may also possess
attributes considered desirable in a business context, such as confidence, perceived creativity,
ability to manage impressions, and aggressive pursuit of business opportunities (Caldwell and
O’Reilly 1982, Raskin et al. 1991, Chatterjee and Hambrick 2007, Brunell et al. 2008, Babiak et
al. 2010, Goncalo et al. 2010, Nevicka et al. 2011, Zettler and Solga 2013, Ong et al. 2016). For
example, narcissistic managers are more likely to be seen as inspirational, creative, and better
able to cope with organizational change (Deluga 1997, Maccoby 2007, Spangler et al. 2012).
Consistent with these perceptions, narcissists are more likely to emerge as leaders (Judge et al.
2006, Wille et al. 2013), and narcissistic CEOs obtain higher compensation (O’Reilly et al.
2014). Similarly, Machiavellians may be more likely to rise to leadership positions (Spurk et al.
2016) and may be more successful in certain positions, as evidenced by superior performance for
high-Machiavellian stockbrokers (Shultz 1993, Aziz et al. 2002). High self-monitors likewise
obtain more promotions and more prestigious positions at other firms (Kilduff and Day 2004), in
addition to enjoying higher performance ratings on the job (Mehra et al. 2001). Babiak (1995)
suggests that even psychopaths may be able to manipulate their way to organizational success.
Finally, Furnham et al. (2012) find that individuals with dark personalities self-rate as having
better development and success at work. While some research takes a more balanced view of
dark personalities, discussing both pros and cons of leaders with these traits (Rosenthal and
Pittinsky 2006), a larger stream of literature presents evidence of negative consequences.
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Despite the rise of leaders with dark personalities and the previously discussed evidence
of higher pay, performance evaluations, and promotion potential, research suggests these
individuals often have destructive effects on their organizations. Narcissistic leaders are more
likely to violate company ethical standards (O’Connor et al. 1995, Blickle et al. 2006) and create
unhappy workplaces (Blair et al. 2008). Much of their perceived creativity is likely a façade
(Goncalo et al. 2010), and they inhibit the performance of groups they lead (Nevicka et al. 2011).
Narcissists may even be skilled enough at manipulation and self-promotion that many of the
promotions they obtain are undeserved (Hogan et al. 1990). Machiavellian leaders have also
been shown to decrease trust and employee wellbeing in the workplace (Gkorezis et al. 2015,
Belschak et al. 2018), and to worsen the ethical climate in their organizations (Den Hartog and
Belschak 2012). High self-monitors produce negative workplace consequences including
unintended employment turnover (Allen et al. 2005) and less accurate performance evaluation
and pay decisions for subordinates (Jawahar 2001). Finally, psychopaths display a tendency to
abuse employees and create unhealthy environments (Boddy et al. 2015), as well as to reduce
corporate performance and employee creativity (Boddy 2017). In addition to these previously
examined negative organizational effects, leaders with dark personality traits are generally
viewed as being inconsistent with multiple cultures’ perceptions of positive ethical leadership
(Eisenbeiss and Brodbeck 2014). Further, the negative effects of dark personalities on
organizations also extends into the particular realm of earnings management and accounting
choices.
2.3 Dark Personalities and Earnings Management
Prior research utilizing both theory and archival methods suggests that dark personality
traits impact the propensity to push ethical boundaries on the job, including in the realm of
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accounting and reporting. Duchon and Drake (2009), Amernic and Craig (2010), and Boddy
(2011) all form theoretical arguments to reinforce the link between managers’ narcissism and
willingness to push ethical boundaries. Cohen et al. (2010) analyze cases of past fraud and
conclude that manager attributes such as narcissism, autocratic leadership style, and reputation
concern represent fraud risk factors. Rijsenbilt and Commandeur (2013), Olsen et al. (2014),
Ham et al. (2017), and Buchholz et al. (2019) all use large datasets to show that CEO and CFO
narcissism are positively associated with earnings management and fraud. Van Scotter and
Roglio (2020) analyze prior scandals and find an association between dark personality traits and
CEO misconduct.
Experimental accounting research similarly suggests that personality traits provide a
glimpse into the accounting-related behaviors that managers display on the job. For example,
Murphy (2012) finds that high Machiavellian individuals are more likely to misreport
performance. Ham et al. (2017) find that narcissistic individuals are more likely to misreport
monetary allocations assigned to them. Johnson et al. (2013) indicate that auditors view client
manager narcissism as a fraud risk indicator. Greenfield et al. (2008) find that high relativists are
more likely to manage earnings than high idealists. Consistent with this finding, Elias (2002)
indicates that accountants who are high on trait relativism and low on trait idealism view
earnings management as more ethically acceptable than accountants who have other ethical
orientations. Seybert (2010) finds that high self-monitors are more likely to engage in real
earnings management. Chung and Hsu (2017) demonstrate that individuals with lower cognitive
moral development misreport to a greater extent. Finally, Majors (2016) shows that individuals
with the dark personality traits of Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy report more
aggressively. In summary, a variety of prior accounting studies indicates that a number of
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observable and measurable personality traits, particularly dark personality traits, predict the
willingness of individuals to push ethical boundaries in the accounting context.
We base the selection of dark personality traits for Candidate A on the prior research
linking traits to unethical behavior. Candidate A’s traits reflect high narcissism,
Machiavellianism, and self-monitoring, as well as moral disengagement and relativism, a
“powerful others” locus of control, and the ability to rationalize behaviors. In particular,
Candidate A likes to be the center of attention and appreciates flattery, thinks that leadership
requires pleasing those in positions of power, believes morals can differ across people and
situations, and will change his/her behavior to suit different people in different situations.
Candidate A also believes results are more important than process, rules should be rewritten
when necessary, and subordinates should only receive limited information. Candidate A is
willing to take actions inconsistent with personal core values, can justify these actions after the
fact, and accepts that his/her own decisions may negatively impact others. Although some of
these traits in isolation may represent potential positives (e.g., changing behaviors to suit
different people and situations), we anticipate that Candidate A, compared to Candidate B, will
be viewed as a worse manager when considering the overall collection of attributes. 4
Furthermore, the candidates may differ in terms of likeability due to their different personality
traits. For example, Candidate A has some traits that people might consider to be unappealing
(e.g., Candidate A is narcissistic), while Candidate B has traits that people might consider to be
commendable (e.g., Candidate B is an idealist). Thus, we anticipate that Candidate A will be

4

Participants in our second validation study rate Candidate A as worse at managing people, managing the work
environment, work habits, and interpersonal traits. Although our particular personality profile appears to convey
negative information about Candidate A’s overall managerial qualities, our studies cannot rule out that some leaders
with dark personalities have other desirable attributes in certain organizational contexts.
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viewed as less likeable than Candidate B because Candidate A possesses more dark personality
characteristics than Candidate B.
In order for accounting managers who have dark personality traits associated with a
predisposition to manage earnings to propagate in the labor market, employers must have the
ability to identify those individuals. Research in management emphasizes the importance of
assessing person-organization (PO) fit during the employee selection process to help distinguish
between similarly qualified job candidates (Schneider 1987, Chatman 1989, Rynes and Gerhart
1990, Cable and Judge 1997, Edwards 2008) by, for example, evaluating job candidate
personality profiles (Stabile 2002, Krell 2005, Baez 2013). In addition, executive recruitment
firms claim to assess job candidate personality traits before referring a candidate to a client.5 PO
fit reflects the perceived congruence between the organization’s culture, values, goals, and norms
and the job candidate’s personality, values, goals, and attitudes (Kristof 1996). Combining prior
accounting research linking dark personalities to earnings management and other accounting
improprieties with research on PO fit, we argue that a company with higher earnings
management pressure could judge a candidate with dark personality traits as providing a better fit
due to the candidate’s perceived willingness to push ethical boundaries.
This discussion highlights several interrelated factors leading to our hypothesis. First,
many organizations face considerable pressure to manage earnings. Second, earnings
management is, at minimum, tacitly allowed by many organizations as an efficient means to
achieve earnings-related objectives. Third, an accounting professional’s ability and willingness

5

See, for example, the websites of two large executive recruitment firms—Lucas Group and Korn Ferry
International. Lucas Group states that “Our detailed interviewing process enables Lucas Group’s HR recruiters to
precisely match qualifications, cultural fit and long-term compatibility, and they ensure lasting and successful
placements…” Korn Ferry states that “…behavior-based approaches to interviewing consistently lead to better
results in identifying the right talent for the job.”
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to manage earnings is part of the overall skillset they provide. Fourth, personality traits may be
informative about an individual’s accounting-related behaviors and predispositions, which are
manifest in on-the-job performance. Fifth, organizations seek to match the demands of the
positions they fill with the skills, capabilities, and personalities of the individuals whom they hire
to fill those positions. This discussion leads to our main research hypothesis, stated in alternative
form:
Hypothesis: As organizational pressure to manage earnings increases, job candidates
possessing more dark personality traits are more likely to be hired for accounting
manager positions than job candidates possessing fewer dark personality traits.
3. Instrument Validation Studies
3.1. Purpose of Studies
The instruments that we use to test our research hypothesis provide participants with
information about the personality traits of two candidates who are being considered for a highlevel accounting position at an organization. The personality traits of the candidates are
embedded within the personality profile section of the applicant dossier. Appendix A provides
the personality profiles of the two hypothetical job candidates, and Appendix B summarizes how
we developed the profiles. The candidate dossiers contain a variety of information in addition to
the personality profile, such as education, work experience, and certification. We do not overtly
state that either job candidate does or does not manage earnings. Instead, participants themselves
must infer any such predisposition from the personality profiles. 6

6

An alternative approach would be to overtly state that the job candidate does or does not manage earnings. This
approach seems problematic because there is no evidence that job candidates and employers talk about earnings
management in such an overt way.
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One job candidate has more dark personality traits, which should be associated with a
predisposition to manage earnings (this candidate is referred to as “Candidate A”), while the
other candidate has fewer dark personality traits (this candidate is referred to as “Candidate B”).
The purpose of the two instrument validation studies reported in this section is to show that
Candidate A, relative to Candidate B, is perceived by our participants as being predisposed to
manage earnings (Instrument Validation Study A) but is not perceived by our participants to be a
better overall manager (Instrument Validation Study B).
3.2. Instrument Validation Study A
3.2.1. Participant Recruitment
We randomly selected 2,500 professionals from U.S. companies on the LexisNexis
Academic Executive List.7 Each of the professionals had a title indicating involvement in the
accounting and/or finance function. The study was administered through Qualtrics. We contacted
business professionals in two ways – (1) an initial email and a follow-up email approximately
one week later and (2) a letter to the street address of each individual who had a valid email
address. Of the 2,500 business professionals we contacted, 344 had an invalid email/street
address. A total of 59 experienced business professionals participated in this study, resulting in a
response rate of 2.74 percent.8
3.2.2. Instrument
Participants are provided with background information about a public company that is
trying to fill a senior accounting manager position. Participants learn that company personnel

7

We use this same database in Instrument Validation Study A and Experiment 1, each time randomly selecting a
new, non-overlapping sample of business professionals.
8
The demographics for participants in this instrument validation study are very similar to those in Experiment 1 (see
Table 2 for Experiment 1 demographics). For brevity, we do not tabulate demographic information for Instrument
Validation Study A.
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have evaluated a large pool of candidates and that two finalists have been chosen. For each
candidate, the instrument provides information about (1) education and certification, (2) work
experience, and (3) the job candidate personality profile.9 By design, the candidate summaries
are extremely similar in terms of the information conveyed by items (1) and (2), but they differ
in terms of the information conveyed by item (3).10 The instrument defines the phrase “earnings
management” to give participants a common understanding of what this phrase generally means.
Our definition is a composite definition from the academic literature (Schipper 1989, Healy and
Wahlen 1999, Dechow and Skinner 2000), which is as follows:
Senior accounting managers frequently make accounting estimates and accounting-related
professional judgments. These estimates and judgments can have a large influence on the
amounts reported in a firm’s financial statements, including net income. Ideally, senior
accounting managers make estimates and judgments in ways that produce accurate and
transparent financial statements. In some cases, senior accounting managers desire to achieve
a particular level of earnings, and they may alter their estimates and judgments to get that
outcome. This is called “earnings management.” When senior accounting managers manage
earnings, the main consequence is that the firm’s financial statements do not accurately
reflect the firm’s true economic performance.

Participants then respond to questions that elicit their views about each job candidate (see Table
1 for questions). Participants respond on a 100-point sliding scale, with the left endpoint labeled
“Definitely Candidate A” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely Candidate B.”
3.2.3. Results
Table 1 provides participant responses to 14 questions about earnings management and
moral/ethical pliability. Participants have strongly polarized views, as indicated by the fact that

9

The instrument informs participants that as part of the company’s employment application process, each candidate
was required to complete a personality assessment questionnaire designed to elicit the behaviors, beliefs, and values
that the job candidate is most likely to exhibit on the job.
10
In our Instrument Validation Studies and Experiments 1 and 2, participants view the job candidate personality
profiles side-by-side. When presenting the profiles, we vary the order in which they are presented. For half of the
participants, the candidate with more dark personality traits is presented in the first column and the other candidate
is presented in the second column (and vice-versa). The first candidate is always labeled Candidate A and the
second candidate is always labeled Candidate B. There are no order effects in any study (all p > 0.20).
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all responses are significantly different from the midpoint of the scale (all t ≥ 7.82, all p < 0.01).
Participants believe that Candidate A (the candidate with more dark personality traits) is most
likely to initiate efforts to manage earnings (Question 1), most likely to encourage others to
manage earnings (Question 4), most susceptible to pressure from others to manage earnings
(Question 5), most likely to believe that the positive consequences of earnings management
justify engaging in that behavior (Question 7), most likely to participate in types of earnings
management that would be considered fraud (Question 8), most likely to engage in a series of
seemingly harmless accounting decisions that lead to serious accounting infractions, including
fraud (Question 11), and most likely to relax their standards of ethical behavior in the face of
professional gain (Question 13). Thus, we find that Candidate A, relative to Candidate B, is
perceived to be more likely to engage in earnings management and related accounting behaviors.
In contrast, participants believe that Candidate B (the candidate with fewer dark
personality traits) is least likely to go along with existing efforts to manage earnings (Question
2), most uncomfortable managing earnings (Question 3), most likely to steer others away from
managing earnings (Question 6), most likely to follow a company code of ethics that prohibits
earnings management (Question 9), most likely to set an exemplary standard of ethical behavior
(Question 10), most likely to hold himself/herself to the highest ethical standards (Question 12),
and least likely to relax their own standards of ethical behavior in the face of professional
hardship (Question 14). Thus, we find that Candidate B, relative to Candidate A, is perceived to
be less likely to engage in earnings management and related accounting behaviors.
3.2.4. Discussion
Participants appear to interpret the job candidate personality profiles in the manner we
expect. Candidate A, who possesses more dark personality traits relative to Candidate B, is
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perceived as being predisposed to manage earnings. At the same time, Candidate A, relative to
Candidate B, is also perceived to be more likely to fall prey to accounting-related ethical
infractions (and more likely to ensnare others in those same ethical infractions), which, even if
initially small, could lead to serious infractions later, including outright fraud. Concurrently,
Candidate B, who possesses fewer dark personality traits relative to candidate A, is perceived to
be largely immune to such temptations and is perceived to be unlikely to allow accountingrelated ethical infractions to propagate in organizations. As a result, organizations that hire
Candidate A over Candidate B are exposed to certain negative consequences if the earnings
management behavior to which Candidate A is predisposed actually unfolds.
3.3. Instrument Validation Study B
3.3.1. Participant Recruitment
We recruited participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (see Rennekamp
2012). There are 99 participants who average approximately 33 years of age and 13 years of
work experience.11 We compensated each participant $2.00 to complete this study, which takes
approximately 15 minutes. The age and experience profiles of these participants suggest that they
are suitable for the task that we have them perform.
3.3.2. Instrument
Participants are informed that a company’s senior accounting manager recently retired
and that the company has hired a new senior accounting manager to fill the position. Participants
then learn about the company’s financial objectives, which the accounting manager is expected
to help achieve. These financial objectives include achieving profit goals, avoiding negative

11

The concept of a response rate is not relevant in this study. We sought 100 participants and once that threshold
number of participants was met, the study was closed. There was one individual who requested payment but did not
complete the study, which is why the study has 99 qualified participants rather than 100.
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earnings surprises, reporting smooth earnings, and displaying financial strength and stability.12
Participants are also informed that employees of the company are committed to achieving the
financial objectives. Participants then learn about the senior accounting manager’s role within
the company, which includes overseeing accounting operations and making important judgments
and decisions related to financial reporting.
Next, participants learn that two qualified job candidates were selected as finalists for the
position. Participants then receive the job candidate summaries, which provide information about
each candidate’s (1) education and certification, (2) work experience, and (3) personality. By
design, the candidate summaries are extremely similar in terms of the information conveyed by
items (1) and (2), but they differ substantially in terms of the information conveyed by item (3).
Participants then learn that either Candidate A was hired or that Candidate B was hired (this is
our between-subjects manipulation). Participants respond to 27 statements that elicit attributions
about why the particular candidate was hired. The statements are clustered around six
managerial/personal skills – managing people, managing the work environment, managing
activities, work habits, interpersonal traits, and managing earnings to achieve desired accounting
outcomes. We have participants respond on a 100-point scale (the left endpoint is labeled
“Definitely Disagree” and the right endpoint is labeled “Definitely Agree”). Representative
statements, one for each of the managerial/personal skills, are provided below (these statements
are for the condition in which participants learn that Candidate A was hired over Candidate B):
1.

Candidate A will provide more constructive feedback to staff than Candidate B
(managing people dimension)

2.

Candidate A will maintain staff morale better than Candidate B (managing the
work environment dimension)

12

The financial objectives presented to participants are common objectives of public companies, which may create
pressure to manage earnings (Graham et al. 2005).
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3.

Candidate A will plan activities of the accounting department better than Candidate
B (managing activities dimension)

4.

Candidate A will work more efficiently than Candidate B (work habits dimension)

5.

Candidate A is more pleasant than Candidate B (interpersonal traits dimension)

6.

Candidate A will more likely remove any roadblocks to achieving profit goals than
Candidate B (managing earnings to achieve desired accounting outcomes
dimension)

3.3.3. Results
Figure 1 graphs mean responses by condition. We find that the mean responses for each
managerial/personal skill type are significantly different between conditions (all p ≤ 0.01) except
for the mean responses related to managing activities (p = 0.78). A difference in the means
implies that participants attribute the organization’s hiring decision to differential candidate
abilities in a given managerial/personal skill. For example, participant responses to the
statements about managing people have a mean of 54.04 when participants learn that Candidate
A was hired and a mean of 70.79 when participants learn that Candidate B was hired. The
significant difference between conditions suggests that participants attribute the hiring of
Candidate B to relatively strong capabilities at managing people. The same inference can be
drawn about Candidate B relative to Candidate A with respect to managing the work
environment, work habits, and interpersonal traits.
There is a dramatic reversal with respect to statements related to managing earnings to
achieve accounting outcomes. The mean is 76.68 when participants learn that Candidate A was
hired and only 54.27 when participants learn that Candidate B was hired. This suggests that
participants attribute the hiring of Candidate A to his/her comparatively strong capabilities at
managing earnings to achieve accounting outcomes. In summary, Candidate B is perceived to be
a better manager than Candidate A on four of the six managerial/personal skills, and Candidate A
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is perceived to be a better manager than Candidate B on only one of the six managerial/personal
skills – managing earnings to achieve accounting outcomes. We conclude that the dark
personality traits embedded in the profile of Candidate A signal a predisposition to manage
earnings but do not simultaneously signal superior managerial/personal skills in other areas.
3.3.4. Discussion
The results of Instrument Validation Study B indicate that Candidate A’s personality
profile conveys the message that Candidate A is predisposed to manage earnings without
concurrently conveying the message that Candidate A is a better overall manager than Candidate
B. Further, this study suggests that Candidate B is considered to be a better overall manager than
Candidate A on the important work-related dimensions we measure, which makes it reasonable
to expect that Candidate B will experience greater accounting labor market success than
Candidate A. As a consequence, it appears that there is a substantial hurdle that Candidate A
must overcome in order to be hired over Candidate B for a high-level accounting position—the
organization must be willing to forego hiring the job candidate who is judged to be the better
overall manager in order to hire the job candidate who is predisposed to manage earnings. To the
extent that Candidate A is favored over Candidate B, the accounting labor market would seem to
value one managerial capability above the others—the ability and willingness to manage
earnings that is signaled by dark personality traits.
4. Experiment 1
4.1. Purpose
The purpose of this experiment is to empirically test our research hypothesis using
company executives who have very substantial experience making hiring decisions. We use the
context of a for-profit public company versus a non-profit foundation to test whether the hiring
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preference for a candidate with dark personality traits is impacted by the earnings management
pressure faced at public companies.
4.2. Participant recruitment
We randomly selected 5,000 professionals from U.S. companies on the LexisNexis
Academic Executive List. Each of the professionals has a job title indicating involvement in the
accounting and/or finance function at their organization. The experiment was administered via
Qualtrics. We contacted professionals in two ways – (1) an initial email and a follow-up email
approximately one week later and (2) a letter to the street address of each individual who had a
valid email address. Of the 5,000 business professionals we contacted, 749 had an invalid
email/street address. A total of 113 experienced business professionals participated in this
experiment, resulting in a response rate of 2.66 percent.
4.3. Demographics
Demographic information is reported in Panel A of Table 2. Participants’ mean age is
50.71 years and their mean work experience is 27.74 years. Participants indicate that they are
familiar with the duties of accounting managers (mean 8.83 on a 10-point scale with higher
responses indicating greater familiarity) and with evaluating job candidates for purposes of
making hiring decisions or hiring recommendations (mean 9.04 on a 10-point scale with higher
responses indicating greater familiarity). The mean employee headcount at participants’
organizations is 5,902.50. Approximately 67 percent of participants have experience working for
a public company, and approximately 60 percent of participants have experience working for a
non-profit organization. The mean number of accounting and finance courses taken is 11.65 and
5.76, respectively.13 Approximately 53 percent of participants are male. Participants generally

13

These questions did not specify whether “courses” refers to college courses or continuing professional education
courses. These means may be lower if the questions specified formal college courses.
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hold titles indicating a high level of professional achievement (i.e., chief financial officer, chief
accounting officer, controller, etc.).
4.4. Instrument
Participants take the role of an executive who learns that the senior accounting manager
at their employer has decided to retire. The executive is in the process of finding a successor for
the senior accounting manager. Participants are randomly assigned to either the for-profit public
company condition or the non-profit foundation condition. In the for-profit public company
condition, participants learn about the company’s financial objectives, which include meeting
profit goals, avoiding negative earnings surprises, reporting smooth earnings, and showing
financial strength and stability.14 In the non-profit foundation condition, participants learn about
the foundation’s financial objectives, which include fulfilling donor directives, maintaining
proper stewardship of donations, controlling operating costs, and transparency related to
reporting activities.15 All participants are informed that (1) employees are committed to
achieving the financial objectives, (2) there is a belief among employees that failure to achieve
financial objectives will adversely affect the company/foundation, and (3) the senior accounting
manager’s particular role within the company/foundation includes, among other things,
overseeing accounting operations and making important judgments and decisions related to
financial reporting.

14

It is noteworthy that these financial objectives are neither extreme nor stylized. Rather, they are drawn from prior
research documenting earnings-related pressures experienced by managers of many companies (e.g., Burgstahler
and Dichev 1997, Brown and Caylor 2005, Graham et al. 2005). Presenting participants with an ecologically valid
set of financial objectives improves the external validity of this experiment.
15
We could have fully crossed organizational type and financial objectives in a 2 × 2 design (instead of identifying
the two cells in the 2 × 2 design that allow us to most efficiently test our hypothesis). We chose not to pursue a 2 × 2
design for two reasons. First, the two organizational types (for-profit and non-profit) are paired with appropriate
financial objectives in the two cells we consider. If we used a 2 × 2 design we would have to, for example, pair a
non-profit organization with for-profit financial objectives and vice-versa, which would reduce the ecological
validity of our manipulations. Second, we would have to populate twice the number of cells with highly experienced
practicing managers, which are generally difficult participants to recruit.
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By varying the type of business entity and related financial reporting objectives, we
manipulate the extent to which participants feel that the entity faces pressure to manage earnings.
Notice that in a non-profit foundation, compared to a for-profit company, there is comparatively
low pressure to manage key financial reporting metrics.16 There is no disagreement that for-profit
public companies face a variety of earnings-related pressures (Healy and Wahlen 1999), so
manipulating the type of entity seeking to hire a senior accounting manager allowed for the
cleanest test of our hypothesis.
Participants are informed that company/foundation personnel have evaluated a large pool
of job candidates and that two finalists have been chosen (referred to as “Candidate A” and
“Candidate B”). The task of our participants is to indicate which candidate they believe the
company/foundation will hire. The materials explain that both candidates are highly qualified for
the position, performed well in their interviews, were liked by the interviewers, displayed strong
communication skills, and received excellent recommendations from previous employers.
Participants also receive job candidate summaries which provide information about (1) education
and certification, (2) work experience, and (3) the job candidate personality profile. By design,
the candidate summaries are extremely similar in terms of the information conveyed by items (1)
and (2), but the summaries differ substantially in terms of information conveyed by item (3).17

16

Research by Chen (2016) and Yetman and Yetman (2012, 2013) suggests that non-profit entities face some
pressure to manage financial reports. As a result, it is possible that there may be no difference in hiring decisions
between the for-profit public company condition and the non-profit foundation condition. At the same time, there is
no indication in the extant literature that the intensity of pressure to manage financial reports in the non-profit sector
matches the intensity of the pressure to manage financial reports in the for-profit sector.
17
Efforts to equalize education and work experience between the job candidates were extensive. Both candidates (1)
worked at a Big 4 accounting firm, (2) achieved the rank of manager, and (3) have undergraduate and graduate
degrees in accounting from respected public universities. Participants also respond to a series of salience checks
which take the form of true/false questions. For example, one true/false question states that “Both candidates
received excellent recommendations from previous employers” while another question states that “Both candidates
possess similar qualifications for the senior accounting manager position.” Participants correctly respond to the
salience check questions between 85 percent and 100 percent of the time. The inferences and conclusions of this
experiment are unaffected by removing participants who missed salience checks.
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While the job candidates are very different, it is important to note that the instrument
makes it clear that the role of the chosen candidate in the organization does not extend beyond
the accounting function. The position being filled is a senior accounting manager position with
financial reporting responsibilities. However, the hired individual will have no role in managing
functional areas of the organization outside of accounting. As a result, the perceived capability of
a job candidate to engage in business activities that create firm value are only relevant insofar as
those capabilities translate into running the accounting function.
Because decades of prior research have established PO fit as an antecedent to important
hiring decisions (e.g., Cable and Judge 1997), we have participants evaluate PO fit before
making their hiring decision. Participants respond to nine PO fit questions (referred to as “fit
questions” below) that we develop from prior literature (see Appendix C). Because there are no
substantive differences between the candidates other than their personality traits, PO fit
assessments reflect participants’ perceptions about the compatibility between the entity’s
financial objectives and the candidates’ personalities. Participants respond to the fit questions on
a 100-point sliding scale. The left endpoint labeled “Definitely Candidate A” and the right
endpoint labeled “Definitely Candidate B.”18
Participants then respond to the job candidate selection question, which states “Based on
your assessment of the candidates and the information about the Company (Foundation), which
candidate do you believe the Company (Foundation) will most likely hire to fill the senior
accounting manager position?”19 Participants respond on the same 100-point sliding scale as the
18

For all of the questions using the 100-point sliding scale, the slider starts at the mid-point of the scale. Participants
must move the slider in either direction to continue. Once the slider is moved in either direction, the mid-point of the
scale cannot be selected. Participants do not see numerical values on the scale, but we translate their scale position to
a numerical value between 1 and 100, inclusive. In the instructions, participants are informed that moving the slider
closer to one end of the scale or the other indicates the strength of their response.
19
Participants may respond to questions in ways that they believe are “correct” or socially acceptable (Fisher 1993).
Social desirability bias may influence variable means and relationships among variables (Zerbe and Paulhus 1987).
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fit questions. We analyze both a continuous response and a dichotomous response. The
dichotomous response is coded as 0 if the response is below the mid-point of the scale (a
preference for Candidate A) and 1 if the response is above the mid-point of the scale (a
preference for Candidate B). Next, we elicit participants’ responses to the following question:
“Based on the information presented in the job candidate profile summary report for Candidate
A, how much did you like Candidate A?” We ask the same question about Candidate B.
Participants respond on a 10-point scale with the left endpoint labeled “Definitely disliked” and
the right endpoint labeled “Definitely liked.” Participants like Candidate B (mean = 6.33)
significantly more than Candidate A (mean = 4.14) (t = 6.96, p < 0.01), which reinforces the
notion that Candidate A possesses fewer accompanying desirable traits compared to Candidate
B. Finally, participants answer salience checks and demographic questions.
4.5. Results
To test our central hypothesis, we examine whether hiring decisions differ between type
of organization. Because PO fit assessments generally occur before the hiring decision in the real
world, we also explore whether PO fit assessments are affected by organization type. We form a
composite measure of PO fit by averaging the responses to the nine questions shown in
Appendix C. An averaging approach is appropriate because the PO fit questions collectively
measure one unidimensional construct. Cronbach’s (1951) alpha is 0.96 and there is a single
eigenvalue greater than one (it is 6.77).
Panel A of Figure 2 provides the mean continuous PO fit assessment and the
dichotomous PO fit assessment in the for-profit public company condition (recall that this is the
condition in which the organization faces comparatively high pressure to manage earnings). The

However, indirect questioning may reduce the effect of social desirability bias (Fisher 1993). Thus, we phrase the
candidate selection question using indirect questioning.
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mean assessment is 31.53 and is significantly below the midpoint of the 100-point response scale
(t = 6.04, p < 0.01). This indicates that Candidate A is considered to be the better fit. Likewise,
when the PO fit assessment is dichotomized at the scale’s midpoint, 85.71 percent of participants
believe that Candidate A is the better fit, while only 14.29 percent believe that Candidate B is the
better fit. The percentages are significantly different from the midpoint (χ2 = 28.57, p < 0.01),
indicating a strong belief that Candidate A is the better fit in the context of a for-profit public
company that faces pressure to manage earnings.
Panel B provides the mean continuous choice and dichotomous choice in the for-profit
public company condition. The mean continuous choice is 23.93 and is significantly below the
midpoint of the response scale (t = 7.09, p < 0.01). This indicates that Candidate A is considered
most likely to be hired. When the continuous choice is dichotomized at the scale’s midpoint, we
find that 87.50 percent of the participants believe that Candidate A is most likely to be hired and
only 12.50 percent believe that Candidate B is most likely to be hired. These percentages are
significantly different from the midpoint (χ2 = 31.50, p < 0.01), indicating a strong belief that
Candidate A will be hired. These results, when considered along with the PO fit results, indicate
that Candidate A will likely be hired over Candidate B because Candidate A is considered a
better fit for the senior accounting manager position in the organization that faces greater
pressure to manage earnings.
Panel C of Figure 2 provides the mean continuous PO fit assessment and the dichotomous
PO fit assessment in the non-profit foundation condition (recall that this is the condition in which
the organization faces comparatively lower pressure to manage earnings). The mean fit
assessment is 69.63, which is significantly above the midpoint of the 100-point response scale (t
= 6.64, p < 0.01). This indicates that Candidate B is considered to be the better fit. Similarly,
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when the fit assessment is dichotomized at the scale’s midpoint, 87.72 percent of participants
believe that Candidate B is the better fit, while only 12.28 percent believe that Candidate A is the
better fit. The percentages are significantly different from the midpoint (χ2 = 32.44, p < 0.01),
indicating a strong belief that Candidate B is the better fit in the context of a non-profit
foundation that faces comparatively low pressure to manage earnings.
Panel D provides the mean continuous choice and dichotomous choice in the non-profit
foundation condition. The mean of the continuous choice is 75.91 and is significantly above the
midpoint of the response scale (t = 7.01, p < 0.01). This indicates that Candidate B is most likely
to be hired. When the continuous choice is dichotomized at the midpoint, 85.96 percent believe
that Candidate B is the most likely to be hired, while only 14.04 percent believe that Candidate A
is the most likely to be hired. The percentages are significantly different from the midpoint (χ2 =
29.49, p < 0.01), indicating a strong belief that Candidate B will be hired. These results, when
considered along with the PO fit results, indicate participants’ belief that Candidate B will be
hired over Candidate A because Candidate B is considered to be a better fit for the senior
accounting manager position in the context of an organization that faces comparatively low
pressure to manage earnings.
To test whether the organization type significantly impacts the hiring decision and fit
assessments, we estimate the effect of ORG_TYPE on HIRE and FIT, where HIRE is
participants’ response to the job candidate selection question (responses are provided on a 100point sliding scale with the left endpoint labeled “Definitely Candidate A” and the right endpoint
labeled “Definitely Candidate B”), FIT is participants’ mean response to the nine PO fit
questions shown in Appendix C (responses are provided on a 100-point sliding scale, with the
left endpoint labeled “Definitely Candidate A” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely
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Candidate B”), and ORG_TYPE is manipulated between subjects as either a for-profit public
company (coded as 1) or a non-profit foundation (coded as 0). The coefficient on ORG_TYPE is
expected to be negative.
Panel A of Table 2 provides a correlation matrix of the study variables. Panel B of Table
2 reports regression results, which show a significant effect of organization type on hiring
decision (β1 = -51.98, t = -9.97, p < 0.01) as well as fit assessment (β2 = -38.10, t = -8.94, p <
0.01).20 The results indicate that Candidate A is more likely to be hired and assessed as a better
fit at the for-profit public company than at the non-profit foundation. Taken together, our results
are quite decisive. In the for-profit public company condition, participants overwhelmingly
believe that Candidate A is the best fit for the position and that he/she will ultimately be hired. In
the non-profit foundation condition, participants overwhelmingly believe that Candidate B is the
best fit for the position and that he/she will ultimately be hired. The only thing that differs
between the two conditions is the type of organization and its related financial objectives. Thus,
we find support for our research hypothesis that organizations facing pressure to manage
earnings tend to favor accounting job candidates with dark personalities.
Although the results of Experiment 1 are consistent with the idea that candidates with
dark personality traits are more likely to be hired for positions that require pushing ethical
boundaries to manage earnings, the experiment has some limitations. For example, there may be
other reasons to prefer Candidate A at a for-profit company but Candidate B at a non-profit
organization. While we believe this context provided a rich environment and interesting context
for testing our hypothesis, we conduct a second experiment to hold the type of organization
constant while manipulating only the pressure to manage earnings.

20

All hypothesized statistical tests, as indicated in our main tables, are reported with one-tailed p-values.
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5. Experiment 2
5.1. Purpose
Experiment 2 seeks to extend Experiment 1 by holding the organization constant and
varying pressure to manage earnings by manipulating the purpose for which the financial
statements will be used (firm valuation versus owner monitoring) in a for-profit private company
setting. Prior research argues that managers of initial public offering firms face considerable
pressure to manage earnings upwards in order to maximize proceeds from the sale of shares (e.g.,
Friedlan 1994, Teoh et al. 1998). Thus, we expect that when the financial statements are used by
valuation professionals to determine the selling price of the company’s stock, Candidate A will
be preferred over Candidate B because Candidate A is viewed as having a proclivity to prepare
financial statements that report higher earnings. We expect the preference for Candidate A will
be greatly reduced when the financial statements are used to monitor and control operations. In
fact, Candidate B may be preferred due to his/her apparent proclivity to provide transparent and
representationally faithful financial information. If candidates with dark personalities are more
likely to be hired in positions with higher earnings management pressure in this alternative
setting, we would have greater confidence that our central hypothesis is descriptively valid.
5.2. Participant recruitment
We obtained participants through Qualtrics, which recruits participants nationwide. We
required participants to meet screening criteria related to age (25 or older), education (bachelor’s
degree or higher), accounting coursework (at least one accounting course), finance coursework
(at least one finance course), and work experience (five years or more). Qualtrics recommends
including a memory question, which enables identifying participants who have not carefully
attended to the task and denying payment to those participants. The data provided by Qualtrics
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excludes those participants who miss the memory question. Our arrangement with Qualtrics
called for 110 participants at a total cost of $625.21
5.3. Demographics
Demographic information is reported in Panel A of Table 3. Participants’ mean age is
51.15 years and their mean work experience is 28.30 years. Participants indicate that they are
familiar with the duties of chief accounting officers (mean = 7.50) and with evaluating job
candidates for purposes of making hiring decisions/recommendations (mean = 7.93).22 The mean
number of accounting and finance courses taken by participants is 5.92 and 4.45, respectively.
Approximately 59 percent of participants are male.
5.4. Instrument
Participants learn that the owner of a private company is currently seeking to hire a chief
accounting officer to oversee the company’s accounting operations, including the preparation of
financial statements. Participants are randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions.
In the firm valuation condition, we state the following:
The owner of the company will sell the company in the near-term. The primary use of the
financial statements, as prepared by the newly-hired chief accounting officer, will be to value
the company. The purpose of valuing the company is to determine its selling price. Outside
valuation professionals will determine the selling price using information reported in the
financial statements. Higher reported earnings and better financial performance reported in
the financial statements will increase the amount for which the owner can sell the company,
thereby enhancing the owner’s wealth.

In the owner monitoring condition, we state the following:
The owner of the company will maintain ownership long-term. The primary use of the
financial statements, as prepared by the newly-hired chief accounting officer, will be to
monitor company operations. The purpose of monitoring company operations is to identify
inefficiencies and correct them quickly. By effectively monitoring operations, the owner will
conserve scarce resources that would otherwise be wasted, thereby enhancing the owner’s
wealth. The ability of the owner to effectively monitor the company’s operations depends on
21

The concept of a response rate is not relevant in this experiment. We sought 110 participants and once that
threshold number of participants was met, the experiment was closed.
22
Responses are provided on a 10-point scale with higher responses indicating greater familiarity.
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the financial statements being informative about what is actually happening within the
company.

By varying the purpose for which the financial statements will be used, we manipulate the extent
to which participants feel that the company faces pressure to manage earnings. The instrument is
silent about the company’s financial objectives and does not ask participants to assess PO fit.
Participants are informed that a large pool of applicants for the chief accounting officer
position has been considered, and two candidates have been selected as finalists. Participants
then receive information about the two job candidates, which is identical to the information
presented to participants in Experiment 1. Participants then respond to the candidate selection
question, which states “Based on your assessment of the two job candidates and the chief
accounting officer position specifically described in this study, which candidate do you believe
that the owner would most likely hire to fill the position?” Participants respond on a 100-point
scale. The left endpoint is labeled “Definitely Candidate A” and the right endpoint is labeled
“Definitely Candidate B.” We also elicit participants’ ratings of the likeability of the two
candidates on a 10-point scale with the left endpoint labeled “Definitely disliked” and the right
endpoint labeled “Definitely liked.” Participants rate Candidate B (mean = 6.41) and Candidate
A (mean = 6.17) equally likeable (t = 0.78, p = 0.44). Lastly, participants answer salience checks,
a manipulation check, and demographic questions.23
5.5. Results
To test whether there is a difference in hiring decisions across the two experimental
conditions, we estimate the effect of PURP on HIRE, where HIRE is participants’ response to
the candidate selection question as discussed in connection with the instrument above, and PURP
is the purpose for which the financial statements will be used, which is manipulated between

23

We have one manipulation check, and 97 percent of our participants respond to it correctly.
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subjects and coded as 1 for the valuation condition and coded as 0 for the monitoring condition.
The coefficient on PURP is expected to be negative.
Panel A of Table 3 provides a correlation matrix of the study variables. Panel B of Table
3 reports the regression results, which show a significant effect of financial statement purpose on
hiring decision (β3 = -20.80, t = -3.07, p < 0.01). In untabulated analyses, we find that
participants’ mean hiring decision in the valuation condition is 29.86, which is significantly
below the midpoint of the scale (t = -4.54, p < 0.01). This indicates that participants in the
valuation condition strongly prefer hiring Candidate A. Participants’ mean hiring decision in the
monitoring condition is 50.66, which does not differ from the midpoint of the scale (t = 0.03, p =
0.97). This indicates that participants in the monitoring condition are largely indifferent between
the two candidates. These findings are consistent with those of Experiment 1, which suggests
that job candidates with dark personalities are favored when organizations face pressure to
manage earnings.
While our results thus far indicate that earnings management pressure increases the
likelihood that candidates with dark personalities will be hired and assessed as a better fit, further
exploration of the recruiting process seems warranted. In particular, for many high-level
positions, professional recruiters provide an initial screening mechanism for potential candidates.
Further, professional recruiters should possess significant experience assessing candidate fit and
personality, as well as matching candidates to jobs based on job descriptions. We conduct a third
experiment using professional recruiters in order to ascertain whether candidates with dark
personalities are more likely to be referred early on in the hiring process, which would further
increase the matching between dark personalities and companies facing earnings management
pressure.
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6. Experiment 3
6.1. Purpose
This experiment examines the fit assessments and client referral decisions of experienced
executive recruitment professionals who screen job candidates before those candidates interview
with company officials. In this experiment, we manipulate between subjects the personality traits
of a job candidate for a high-level accounting position. After evaluating either Candidate A or
Candidate B, participants assess PO fit and indicate how likely the candidate is to be referred to a
client for consideration for a senior accounting manager position.
6.2. Participant Recruitment
We sought participation from executive recruitment professionals who have experience
placing job candidates in accounting and/or finance positions. To identify such participants, we
examined the online biographical sketches of executive recruitment professionals. We invited
561 executive recruitment professionals to participate in our experiment via email (39 emails
were returned as undeliverable) and sent a follow-up email approximately one week later. The
experiment was administered via Qualtrics. To increase the response rate, we offered each
respondent a $10 gift card for participation. A total of 41 executive recruitment professionals
participated in this experiment, resulting in a response rate of 7.85 percent.
6.3. Demographics
Demographic information is reported in Panel A of Table 4. Participants’ mean age is
45.03 years and their mean work experience is 23.21 years. Participants indicate that they are
familiar with the duties of senior accounting managers (mean = 7.47 on a 10-point scale with
higher responses indicating greater familiarity). The mean number of executive searches and
accounting/finance searches in which our participants have been involved is 518.99 and 400.57,
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respectively. The mean number of accounting and finance courses taken by participants is 5.91
and 4.13, respectively. Approximately 64 percent of participants are male.
6.4. Instrument
Participants consider a situation faced by a hypothetical executive recruitment consultant
who works for an executive recruitment firm. Participants are informed that a public company
client of the recruitment firm is seeking to fill a vacant senior accounting manager position.
Participants then learn about the client’s financial objectives, which employees of the client are
committed to achieving (these objectives are identical to those in Instrument Validation Study B
and Experiment 1). Participants are then informed that the consultant is making a decision about
whether to refer a particular candidate to the client to interview for the senior accounting
manager position. The candidate being considered is either Candidate A or Candidate B but not
both (see Appendix A). Thus, we manipulate the personality profile of the job candidate between
subjects at two levels, but hold all other aspects of the job candidate summary constant.24
Participants are randomly assigned to experimental conditions.
The materials explain that the candidate has the technical competence and qualifications
for the senior accounting manager position, but that the client relies on the consultant to ensure
that job candidates who are referred for an interview are a good fit for the position. We develop
five accounting-related PO fit questions tailored to our context (see Appendix D). Participants
respond to these accounting fit questions on a 100-point sliding scale, with the left endpoint
labeled “Definitely not” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely yes.” After responding to the

24

The job candidate profiles are amalgamations of different personality traits as shown in Appendix A. On the
surface, one might speculate that a single trait could be a dominant consideration when making an employee
selection or referral decision. To address this issue, we ask participants in Experiment 3 whether they considered the
candidate’s overall personality profile or they considered only a specific personality trait. Only four of the 41
participants indicated that they focused on a specific personality trait.
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fit questions, participants respond to the client referral question, which states “Based on your
evaluation of the candidate and the information about the client, how likely is the consultant to
refer the candidate to the client to interview for the senior accounting manager position?”
Participants respond on the same 100-point sliding scale as the fit questions. Participants then
rate the likeability of the job candidate on a 10-point scale with the left endpoint labeled
“Definitely disliked” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely liked.” The likeability results
indicate that participants like Candidate B (mean = 5.39) significantly more than Candidate A
(mean = 3.43) (t = 2.49, p = 0.02), which suggests that participants view Candidate A’s
personality as generally less desirable. Lastly, participants answer salience checks, a
manipulation check, and demographic questions.25, 26
6.5. Results
Our central hypothesis predicts that when clients face pressure to manage earnings, job
candidates who possess more dark personality traits are more likely to be referred to clients than
are job candidates who possess fewer dark traits. PO fit is an important consideration to
executive recruitment professionals when making client referral decisions. We form a composite
measure of accounting-related PO fit by averaging the responses to the fit questions shown in
Appendix D. An averaging approach is appropriate because the fit questions collectively

25

We have a single manipulation check question that has three parts, each of which focuses on a different dimension
of the job candidate’s personality. Approximately 85 percent of our participants characterize the job candidate’s
personality in a manner consistent with the intended message of the personality profile.
26
The two job candidates are both perceived to be qualified for a senior accounting manager position, but they are
very different in terms of their personalities (see Section 3). At the same time, both of the candidates are reasonable
representations of job candidates who might pursue a senior accounting manager position. One of the postexperimental questions asks participants in Experiment 3 to indicate whether someone like the job candidate
described would actually apply for a senior accounting manager position. Participants respond on a 10-point scale
with the left endpoint labeled “Definitely not” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely yes.” The mean response
for Candidate A is 8.29 and the mean response for Candidate B is 8.81. Thus, while we have created job candidates
whose personality profiles seem very different, they are not extreme in terms of the types of individuals who might
pursue a senior accounting manager position.
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measure one unidimensional construct. Cronbach’s (1951) alpha is 0.92 and there is a single
eigenvalue greater than one (it is 3.85).
To test our hypothesis in the context of professional recruiter referrals, we examine the
relationship between participants’ client referral decisions and the job candidate being
considered. Thus, we estimate the effect of CAND on REF and AFIT, where REF is participants’
response to the client referral question and AFIT is calculated as participants’ average response
to the five accounting fit questions shown in Appendix D. CAND is manipulated between
subjects, coded as 1 for participants who evaluated Candidate A and coded as 0 for participants
who evaluated Candidate B. The coefficient on CAND is expected to be positive.
Panel A of Table 4 provides a correlation matrix of the study variables, and Panel B
reports the regression results. The coefficient on CAND is positive and significant when
considering the referral decision, REF (β4 = 17.85, t = 1.84, p < 0.05). The coefficient on CAND
is also positive and significant when considering the accounting fit assessment, AFIT (β5 =
46.51, t = 8.41, p < 0.01). These results indicate that Candidate A, relative to Candidate B, is
perceived as a better fit and is more likely to be referred to a position with high earnings
management pressure, which provides support for our central hypothesis. The results also
suggest that screening for candidates with dark personalities could happen very early in the
hiring process, even at the initial recruiting phase.
7. Conclusion
This paper provides provocative evidence about the types of individuals who are hired
into positions of power and authority in the accounting function of organizations. The results of
our studies support our research hypothesis that, in the presence of earnings management
pressure, job candidates who possess more dark personality traits (i.e., Candidate A) are more
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likely to be hired than candidates who possess fewer dark personality traits (i.e., Candidate B).
We also find that executive recruitment professionals are more likely to screen out candidates
without dark personalities before they are considered by prospective employers. Our results arise
despite the fact that (1) Candidate A is considered to be a significantly worse manager than
Candidate B, (2) Candidate A is perceived to be more likely to engage in fraud than Candidate B,
(3) Candidate A is perceived to be less likely to maintain high ethical standards in the face of
adversity than Candidate B, and (4) Candidate A is viewed by many as generally less likeable
than Candidate B. We therefore conclude that the perceived willingness to push ethical
boundaries, as signaled by dark personality traits, represents an important dimension of candidate
fit and hiring potential when organizations face pressure to manage earnings.
The results of this study should be considered in light of potential limitations. First, we
do not examine naturally occurring data (e.g., employment files). Future research could provide
further evidence on this issue if data becomes available. However, privacy issues and legal
concerns may generally preclude such an approach. Second, participants in this study made a
hypothetical decision without all the information that would normally be available when making
hiring and referral decisions in practice. Future research could examine how additional
information (e.g., information about the candidate pool and the position) might amplify or dilute
the impact of candidate personality traits. Third, the design of some of our studies inform
participants about the firm’s financial objectives and also have participants assess PO fit, which
could create demand bias. However, this design choice mimics actual features of the real-world
and thus enhances the generalizability of our results. Fourth, we only expose participants to two
job candidates rather than a large portfolio of job applicants. In the real-world, there are often
numerous job candidates which must be evaluated. However, in order to make our experiments
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tractable and fairly brief, we elected to have participants evaluate two job candidates only. Fifth,
real-world hiring (and promotion) decisions often involve complex trade-offs which are not
easily incorporated into experimental settings. Our settings are simplified in that they (1) involve
limited information, (2) preclude complex deliberations, and (3) reflect a stylized trade-off
between managerial competence and earnings management. Lastly, some of our studies rely on
the voluntary participation of experienced professionals, and response rates in those studies are
somewhat modest and sample sizes are limited. It is possible that the inferences and conclusions
of our research may be sensitive to these features. However, as discussed by Nelson and Skinner
(2013), this concern is reduced when interpreting directional treatment effects, which is the case
in our studies. Furthermore, we conducted multiple experiments to test our hypothesis and this
multiple experiment approach allows us to demonstrate the robustness and generalizability of our
findings with different participant pools and different operationalizations of the constructs of
interest (Asay et al. 2019).
Our results expand upon prior research suggesting that the negative consequences of
hiring managers with dark personalities (e.g., Duchon and Drake 2009, Amernic and Craig 2010,
Boddy 2011, Rijsenbilt and Commandeur 2013, Olsen et al. 2014, Ham et al. 2017, Buchholz et
al. 2019, Van Scotter and Roglio 2020) may stem from those same managers possessing
perceived positive traits such as confidence, creativity, and strong leadership skills (e.g.,
Caldwell and O’Reilly 1982, Raskin et al. 1991, Brunell et al. 2008, Babiak et al. 2010, Goncalo
et al. 2010, Nevicka et al. 2011, Zettler and Solga 2013, Ong et al. 2016). Our experiments
demonstrate that managers with dark personalities may be matched to organizations facing
earnings management pressure not because of their perceived accompanying desirable traits, but
because of their perceived willingness to push ethical boundaries.
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Our findings also raise questions about the effectiveness of promulgating new accounting
rules and regulations as a way to reign in earnings management. The SEC has a long history of
enacting regulations designed to combat earnings management and perceived accounting abuses
(e.g., Staff Accounting Bulletins No. 99, 100, and 101), but the employee selection process in
organizations may result in those organizations populating high-level accounting positions with
individuals who have dark personality traits that are associated with a predisposition to manage
earnings. Under such circumstances, new rules and regulations may have only a modest effect on
earnings management. By focusing on employee selection, we have identified one of the
potential root causes of earnings management. When asking why earnings management persists
over time, we believe one answer to this question resides in the types of people who are recruited
and selected by, and retained in, organizations.
Future research in this area could investigate whether interventions in the recruiting and
hiring process could help reduce the tendency to favor candidates with dark personalities when
earnings management pressure is high. For example, because prior research has shown negative
workplace environment outcomes produced by managers with dark personalities (Duchon and
Drake 2009, Boddy 2011), involving a wider array of current employees (and future
subordinates) in the hiring process may help place increased emphasis on candidate
shortcomings along those dimensions. Research examining whether and how candidates with
dark personalities are attracted to apply to accounting positions in the first place also seems
warranted, as the hiring process involves many sequential steps from candidate job search and
application submission to screening, referral, interviews, and finally the ultimate hiring decision.
Future studies could examine the biases and structural deficiencies in each of these steps that
lead to the recruitment of managers with dark personalities.
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APPENDIX A
Job Candidate Personality Profiles
More dark personality traits (Candidate A)
Fewer dark personality traits (Candidate B)
High moral disengagement
Low moral disengagement
1. Is results-oriented and believes that the end results are more 1. Is process-oriented and believes that the process by
important than the process by which one pursues those
which one pursues results is more important than the
results.
results themselves.
2. Believes that rules must be flexible enough to be adapted to 2. Believes that rules are established purposefully,
different situations and will rewrite the rules if necessary to
should not be circumvented to achieve goals, and
achieve goals.
should be changed only after significant deliberation.
3. Quickly assesses the norms of the organization and looks to 3. Has rigid beliefs about what constitutes acceptable
those norms to determine what behavior is acceptable.
behavior and rarely deviates from those beliefs.
High Machiavellianism
Low Machiavellianism
4. Believes that subordinates should only be privy to the
4. Believes that subordinates should be privy to
specific information needed to do their jobs effectively.
available information.
High narcissism
Low narcissism
5. Responds well to flattery and compliments.
5. Is embarrassed by flattery and compliments.
6. Likes to be the center of attention when in the presence of
6. Is uncomfortable being in the spotlight when in the
important people.
presence of important people.
Ethical orientation – low idealist, high relativist
Ethical orientation – high idealist, low relativist
7. Makes decisions by comparing the benefits and costs of
7. Avoids decisions that might negatively impact
each decision, and accepts that some decisions might
others, even if that harm is insignificant.
negatively impact others in some way.
8. Believes that ideas about what constitutes moral or immoral 8. Believes that ideas about what constitutes moral or
behavior vary from person to person and from situation to
immoral behavior should not vary from person to
situation.
person and from situation to situation.
High self-monitor
Low self-monitor
9. Can change behaviors and opinions to suit different people
9. Does not change behaviors or opinions to suit
and different situations.
different people and different situations.
Locus of control – powerful others
Locus of control – chance
10. Believes that leadership achievements require the ability to
10. Believes that leadership achievements are chiefly
please those in positions of power.
due to being in the right place at the right time.
High ability to rationalize behavior
Low ability to rationalize behavior
11. Will take actions that feel right at the moment even if those
11. Will take actions only after deliberation to avoid
actions seem inconsistent with values.
actions that are inconsistent with values.
12. Can find justifications for actions after the fact.
12. Prefers to avoid having to justify actions after the fact.
Headings are not included in the actual instruments completed by participants in our studies and experiments (they are shown here
for informational purposes only). See Section 3 and Appendix B for a discussion of the job candidate personality profiles and
their development.
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APPENDIX B
Summary of the Development of the Job Candidate Personality Profiles
The starting point in the development of the job candidate personality profiles in Appendix A was to
identify dark personality traits that plausibly signal an individual’s predisposition to manage earnings. Although
there are numerous validated personality scales that meet this criterion, six particular scales stood out as being
suitable for our purpose. In addition, we develop one scale ourselves (a scale designed to measure an individual’s
ability to rationalize questionable behavior). To determine whether the items comprising the scales signal
information about an individual’s predisposition to manage earnings, we conduct a survey using 102 participants
from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform (results not tabulated).
The survey defines “earnings management” using a composite, non-technical definition from the
accounting literature (see Instrument Validation Study A for our definition of earnings management). The survey
then expresses the items comprising the scales as a series of independent statements about the beliefs of an
individual. After each statement, participants rate how likely an individual who holds a particular belief is to
manage earnings. Participants respond on an 11-point scale ranging from -5 to +5, with the left endpoint labeled
“Unlikely to manage earnings,” the right endpoint labeled “Likely to manage earnings,” and the midpoint labeled
“Neutral.” Each of the personality scales is discussed below.
Moral disengagement (Shu, Gino, and Bazerman 2011). Moral disengagement occurs when individuals
try to persuade themselves that their own questionable behavior is morally permissible. The mean of the moral
disengagement items are significantly above zero (mean = 1.61, t = 5.56, p < 0.01), which indicates that
individuals who morally disengage are perceived to be predisposed to manage earnings.
Machiavellianism and narcissism (Paulhus and Jones 2011). Machiavellianism is characterized by
manipulation and exploitation of others, and narcissism is characterized by self-focus and an undue sense of selfimportance. The means of Machiavellianism items (mean = 1.19, t = 5.22, p < 0.01) and the narcissism items
(mean = 1.04, t = 6.29, p < 0.01) are both significantly above zero, which indicates that individuals who measure
high on these personality traits are perceived to be predisposed to manage earnings.
Ethical orientation (Forsyth 1980). Ethical orientation describes an individual’s moral philosophies.
Idealism and relativism are two dimensions of ethical orientation. The mean of the idealist items are significantly
below zero (mean = -0.75, t = -2.71, p < 0.01), indicating that idealists are not perceived to be predisposed to
manage earnings. The mean of the relativist items are significantly above zero (mean = 1.25, t = 5.44, p < 0.01),
indicating that relativists are perceived to be predisposed to manage earnings.
Self-monitoring (Snyder and Gangestad 1986). Self-monitoring is a personality trait characterized by
concern about managing one’s behavior to accommodate social situations. The mean of the self-monitoring items
is significantly above zero (mean = 0.99, t = 5.18, p < 0.01), indicating that high self-monitors are perceived to be
predisposed to manage earnings.
Locus of control (Levenson 1973). Locus of control refers to the extent to which an individual believes
he/she can control events in their lives. The means of the internal locus of control items (mean = 1.72, t = 9.02, p
< 0.01) and the powerful others locus of control items (mean = 0.82, t = 3.71, p < 0.01) are both significantly
above zero, which indicates that individuals who score high on these dimensions are perceived to be predisposed
to manage earnings. The mean of the chance locus of control items is significantly below zero (mean = -0.73, t = 3.59, p < 0.01), which indicates that individuals who score high on this dimension are not perceived to be
predisposed to manage earnings.
Ability to rationalize behavior. Earnings management is often considered to be questionable behavior,
and some individuals can readily rationalize such behavior. The mean of the ability to rationalize behavior items
is significantly above zero (mean = 1.27, t = 4.39, p < 0.01), indicating that those individuals who can readily
rationalize questionable behavior are perceived to be predisposed to manage earnings.
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APPENDIX C
PO Fit Questions
1. Which candidate’s attitude is most compatible with the culture of the Company (Foundation)?
2. Which candidate’s value system is most compatible with the culture of the Company
(Foundation)?
3. Which candidate’s belief system is most compatible with the culture of the Company
(Foundation)?
4. Which candidate's personality is most compatible with the culture of the Company (Foundation)?
5. Which candidate has priorities that are most similar to the priorities of the Company (Foundation)?
6. Which candidate is most likely to clash with the culture of the Company (Foundation)?
7. Which candidate’s behaviors, beliefs, and values will be valued most by the Company
(Foundation)?
8. Which candidate will find the senior accounting manager position most personally and
professionally rewarding?
9. Which candidate is most likely to have to do something they do not like in order to meet the
Company’s (Foundation’s) expectations?
See Section 4 for a discussion of the PO fit questions. Participants in Experiment 1 respond to these
questions on a 100-point sliding scale, with the left endpoint labeled “Definitely Candidate A” and the
right endpoint labeled “Definitely Candidate B.” Responses to questions 6 and 9 are reverse coded for
analysis.
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APPENDIX D
Accounting-Related PO Fit Questions
1. Candidate A (B) will make accounting decisions to bolster reported profits.
2. Candidate A (B) will make accounting decisions to achieve desired profit goals.
3. Candidate A (B) will find a way to report the smoothest possible earnings to keep borrowing costs
low.
4. Candidate A (B) will push boundaries to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts for the company.
5. Candidate A (B) will portray financial performance in the most favorable light possible.
See Section 6 for a discussion of the accounting-related PO fit questions. The organizational behavior and
human resources literature does not provide direct guidance in the formulation of the accounting-related
PO fit questions. When formulating these questions, we drew upon our knowledge of the intersection
between PO fit and accounting. Participants in Experiment 3 respond to these questions on a 100-point
sliding scale, with the left endpoint labeled “Definitely not” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely
yes.”
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FIGURE 1
Graph of Results for Instrument Validation Study B (n=99)
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See Section 3 for a discussion of Instrument Validation Study B. The study manipulates whether participants are
informed that Candidate A was hired or that Candidate B was hired. Participants then respond to a series of 27
statements that elicit their attributions about why one candidate was hired over the other candidate. The statements
are clustered around six managerial/personal skills —managing people, managing the work environment, managing
activities, work habits, interpersonal traits, and managing earnings to achieve accounting outcomes. Participants
respond on a 100-point scale with the left endpoint labeled “Definitely disagree” and the right endpoint labeled
“Definitely agree.”
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FIGURE 2
Graph of Results for Experiment 1
Panel A: Fit assessment in for-profit public company condition (n=56)
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FIGURE 2 (Continued)
Graph of Results for Experiment 1
Panel C: Fit assessment in non-profit foundation condition (n=57)
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Panel D: Choice between job candidates in non-profit foundation condition (n=57)
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See Section 4 for a discussion of Experiment 1. Appendix A contains the personality descriptors for the job
candidates. In Panels A and C, the fit assessment is the mean of the nine PO fit questions shown in Appendix C. In
Panels B and D, the choice between job candidate question states “Based on your assessment of the candidates and
the information about the Company (Foundation), which candidate do you believe the Company (Foundation) will
most likely hire to fill the senior accounting manager position?” In Panels B and D, participants respond on a 100point sliding scale, with the left endpoint labeled “Definitely Candidate A” and the right endpoint labeled
“Definitely Candidate B.” The dichotomous response is coded as 0 if the response is below the mid-point of the
scale (a preference for Candidate A) and 1 if the response is above the mid-point of the scale (a preference for
Candidate B).
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TABLE 1
Results for Instrument Validation Study A (n=59)
Question
1. Which candidate is MOST likely to initiate efforts to manage earnings?
2. Which candidate is LEAST likely to go along with existing efforts to manage
earnings?
3. Which candidate is MOST uncomfortable managing earnings?
4. Which candidate is MOST likely to encourage others to manage earnings?
5. Which candidate is MOST susceptible to pressure from others to manage
earnings?
6. Which candidate is MOST likely to steer others away from managing earnings?
7. Which candidate MOST likely believes that the positive consequences of
earnings management justify engaging in that behavior?
8. Which candidate is MOST likely to participate in types of earnings
management that would be considered fraudulent?
9. Which candidate is MOST likely to follow a company code of ethics that
prohibits earnings management?
10. Which candidate is MOST likely to set an exemplary standard of ethical
behavior?
11. Which candidate is MOST likely to engage in a series of seemingly harmless
accounting decisions that lead to serious accounting infractions, including
fraud?
12. Which candidate holds them self to the HIGHEST ethical standards?
13. Which candidate is MOST likely to relax their standards of ethical behavior in
the face of professional gain?
14. Which candidate is LEAST likely to relax their standards of ethical behavior in
the face of professional hardship?

Mean
10.88
81.76

t-stat.
15.93
9.38

p
<0.01
<0.01

80.93
15.83
15.36

7.82
13.49
12.30

<0.01
<0.01
<0.01

80.49

9.14

<0.01

12.25

15.53

<0.01

14.53

13.87

<0.01

92.05
87.07

23.07
16.14

<0.01
<0.01

15.35

14.86

<0.01

89.19

18.55

<0.01

10.52

26.28

<0.01

84.49

10.09

<0.01

See Section 3 for a discussion of Instrument Validation Study A. Appendix A contains the personality descriptors for the job
candidates. Participants respond to the questions on a 100-point sliding scale, with the left endpoint labeled “Definitely Candidate
A” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely Candidate B.” The t-statistics test whether the mean response differs from the midpoint of the scale.
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TABLE 2
Results for Experiment 1
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables
Variables
1. ORG_TYPE
2. FIT

Mean

SD

N

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

50.75

29.57

113 -0.65**

3. HIRE

50.15

37.98

113 -0.69**

4. Age in years

50.71

9.54

94 0.05

0.02

0.00

27.74

9.82

107 0.08

0.00

0.00

0.86**

8.83

1.56

106 0.12

-0.02

-0.01

-0.27** -0.23**

9.04

1.11

107 0.08

0.04

0.03

-0.09

-0.02

0.38**

106 -0.01

0.08

0.06

-0.08

-0.06

0.00

0.06

5. Work experience in
years
6. Familiarity with
duties of accounting
managers
7. Familiarity with
evaluating job
candidates
8. Employee headcount
at current employer
9. Percent with
experience in a public
company
10. Percent with
experience in a nonprofit organization
11. Number of
accounting courses
taken
12. Number of finance
courses taken
13. Percent male

5,902.50 13,002.67

8

9

10

11

12

0.93**

67.30

47.14

104 0.10

-0.05

-0.04

0.09

0.14

0.21*

0.23*

0.21*

60.38

49.14

106 -0.03

0.13

0.10

0.01

-0.07

0.21*

-0.08

0.02

0.03

11.65

11.84

104 -0.08

0.13

0.10

-0.17

-0.13

0.23**

0.09

0.01

0.23**

0.11

5.76

7.22

105 0.03

0.10

0.14

-0.13

-0.08

0.15

0.13

0.06

0.19*

-0.02

0.71**

53.47

50.13

101 0.03

-0.01

-0.03

0.06

0.11

-0.09

0.09

0.21*

0.30**

-0.13

0.08
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0.27**

Panel B: Regression Results (n = 113)
Dependent
Variable
HIRE
t-statistic
FIT
t-statistic

Independent Variable
Intercept
ORG_TYPE
75.91
β1 = -51.98
20.69
-9.97 **
69.63
23.21

β2 = -38.10
-8.94 **

Model
F-statistic
99.46

Adjusted
R2 (%)
46.78

79.93

41.34

See Section 4 for a discussion of Experiment 1. ORG_TYPE is manipulated between subjects as either a for-profit
public company (coded as 1) or a non-profit foundation (coded as 0); FIT is participants’ mean response to the nine
PO fit questions shown in Appendix C (responses are provided on a 100-point sliding scale, with the left endpoint
labeled “Definitely Candidate A” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely Candidate B”); HIRE is participants’
response to the job candidate selection question (responses are on a 100-point sliding scale with the left endpoint
labeled “Definitely Candidate A” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely Candidate B”). Some participants did
not answer all demographic questions, so the number of observations for each demographic question varies.
Responses to the questions about familiarity with the duties of accounting managers and familiarity with evaluating
job candidates are provided on 10-point scales with higher responses indicating greater familiarity. ** and * denote
statistical significance at p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively. P-values are one-tailed where we have directional
predictions.
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TABLE 3
Results for Experiment 2
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables
Variables

Mean

SD

N

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1. PURP

0.52

0.50

2. HIRE

39.88

36.84

110 -0.28**

3. Age in years
4. Work experience in
years

51.15

15.25

110 0.01

0.11

28.30

34.23

110 0.07

0.17

0.36**

5. Familiarity with duties
of chief accounting officer

7.50

1.67

110 -0.05

0.02

0.02

0.18

6. Familiarity with
evaluating job candidates

7.93

2.05

110 0.03

-0.08

0.00

0.13

0.37**

7. Number of accounting
courses taken

5.92

5.21

109 -0.13

0.10

0.03

0.20

0.10

-0.02

8. Number of finance
courses taken

4.45

4.35

110 -0.12

0.10

-0.09

-0.07

0.04

0.09

0.34**

59.09

49.39

110 -0.10

0.11

0.14

0.18*

0.08

0.08

-0.02

9. Percent male

8

110
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0.07

Panel B: Regression Results (n = 110)
Dependent
Variable
HIRE
t-statistic

Independent Variable
Intercept
PURP
50.66
β3 = -20.80
10.39
-3.07 **

Model
F-statistic
9.43

Adjusted
R2 (%)
7.18

See Section 5 for a discussion of Experiment 2. PURP is the purpose for which the financial statements are used,
which is manipulated between subjects as valuation (coded as 1) or monitoring (coded as 0); HIRE is
participants’ hiring decision (responses are provided on a 100-point sliding scale with the left endpoint labeled
“Definitely Candidate A” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely Candidate B”). One participant did not
respond to the question about the number of accounting courses taken. Responses to the questions about
familiarity with the duties of chief accounting officer and familiarity with evaluating job candidates are provided
on 10-point scales with higher responses indicating greater familiarity. ** and * denote statistical significance at
p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively. P-values are one-tailed where we have directional predictions.
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TABLE 4
Results for Experiment 3
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study Variables
Variables

Mean

1. CAND

4.56

0.50

2. AFIT

60.80

29.11

41 0.80**

3. REF

41.90

31.66

41 0.28*

0.30*

4. Age in years
5. Work experience in
years

45.03

10.81

34 0.02

0.09

-0.33*

23.21

10.22

41 0.21

0.16

-0.19

0.92**

7.47

1.89

40 -0.25

-0.27*

0.00

0.09

0.17

7. Number of executive
searches completed

518.99 1,167.28

40 -0.12

-0.28*

-0.17

0.34*

0.35*

0.24

8. Number of
accounting/finance
searches

400.57

636.93

41 -0.25

-0.38**

-0.07

0.10

0.16

0.34*

9. Number of accounting
courses taken

5.91

5.55

40 -0.09

-0.02

-0.08

0.23

0.40** 0.47** 0.18

0.30*

10. Number of finance
courses taken

4.13

3.75

39 -0.37*

-0.33*

-0.17

-0.02

0.13

0.07

0.54**

63.89

48.71

40 -0.06

-0.08

-0.05

0.49** 0.43** 0.45** 0.24

0.24

0.20

6. Familiarity with duties
of accounting managers

11. Percent male

SD

N

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

41

0.74**

0.48** -0.04
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0.18

Panel B: Regression Results (n=41)
Dependent
Variable
REF
t-statistic
AFIT
t-statistic

Independent Variable
Intercept
CAND
31.89
β4 = 17.85
4.40
1.84 *
34.71
8.38

β5 = 46.51
8.41 **

Model
F-statistic
3.40

Adjusted
R2 (%)
5.67

70.78

63.56

See Section 6 for a discussion of Experiment 3. CAND is the job candidate profile manipulated between subjects as
Candidate A (coded as 1) or Candidate B (coded as 0); AFIT is participants’ mean response to the five accounting fit
questions shown in Appendix D (responses are provided on a 100-point sliding scale, with the left endpoint labeled
“Definitely not” and the right endpoint labeled “Definitely yes”); REF is participants’ response to the client referral
question, which states “Based on your evaluation of the candidate and the information about the client, how likely is
the consultant to refer the candidate to the client to interview for the senior accounting manager position?”
(participants respond on a 100-point sliding scale, with the left endpoint labeled “Definitely not” and the right
endpoint labeled “Definitely yes”). Some participants did not answer all demographic questions, so the number of
observations for each demographic question varies. Responses to the question about familiarity with the duties of
accounting managers are provided on a 10-point scale with higher responses indicating greater familiarity. ** and *
denote statistical significance at p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively. P-values are one-tailed where we have
directional predictions.
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